Peter Lavelle'S BLOG
August 22, 2008, 0:31
South Ossetia – the bigger picture
Since the end of overt hostilities in the South Ossetia-Georgia conflict, reasoned political thinking and PR strategies have taken centre stage. A lot of people are now wondering what happens next. Nothing is set in stone – opportunities remain to resolve this conflict and bolster international security.
I have been covering the daily Russian military briefings – and from day to day they are getting better. At first they were very stiff. I am convinced that some PR folk showed the Col-General how to loosen up a bit – and it’s working. That is the presentation side.
In terms of substances, I have no doubt Russia will create a buffer zone within Georgian territory proper to protect South Ossetia. (That zone is called here the “zone of responsibility”).
This all means that Russian peacekeepers intend to stay for a very long time – beyond the legal and territorial demarcation of South Ossetia. And that presence does fall within legal arrangements signed by Moscow and Tbilisi in 1992 and 1999. This of course will be disputed and ignored by the Western commentariat and their politicians.
What does all this mean?
South Ossetia and Abkhazia are now free and will be free from Tbilisi’s control. And they won’t ever return to central Georgian control. This is the first decisive outcome of Tbilisi’s pre-emptive war.
Russia will have to live with being called an “occupier” for a long time to come. I seriously doubt anyone in the commentariat will ever sit down and read the ’92 -’99 agreements. Sadly this is part of the black PR campaign against Russia and South Ossetia’s legitimate security demands.
Russia’s new peacekeeping format will exclude Georgians. Said differently - Georgia has lost the moral right to demand the return of its breakaway republics. The world should get used to this reality.
South Ossetia and Abkhazia will continue their drive for independence. Russia has made it clear that it will support the will of the people on the ground. But that does not mean immediate recognition of both by Moscow any time soon.
Russia wants a deal – a geopolitical deal. In the South Ossetian-Georgia crisis, Moscow holds almost all the cards. NATO and the West can play rhetorical hardball, but it is Moscow that can make decisions about what happens on the ground.
My sense is that a political resolution will revolve around what the US and NATO do (and not what they say). Russia has the resolve to stand its ground (quite literally), but does NATO, the US, and the West? I don’t think so. Is Saakashvilli really worth it?!
Before I go on, let me make something abundantly clear: Russia will protect the people of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Both are the small players in a much bigger geopolitical game. But this does not mean they will be sacrificed. There are too many ethnic Russians and Russian passport holders beyond Russia’s borders that Moscow can afford to disappoint. This is another new objective reality that has to be seriously considered as a result of this calamity.
Saakashvilli has created a real mess for himself and his American handlers. His departure might be the catalyst for Russia to make an overture. I certainly hope so. Russia and the West are not natural enemies. Most of the security threats the world face are the same security threats Russia and the West face.
My bet is that some folks in DC are sweating a bit and probably have started to lose some sleep. Washington’s Georgia project has really backfired.
Engaging Russia and recognizing Russia’s real security concerns is the real way to move forward. Continued Western support of Saakashvilli is like watching a comedy turn into a farce that ends in still another tragedy.
August 20, 2008, 22:54
Prague Spring vs Tbilisi hangover
Forty years ago, at the height of the 1960s, the Czechoslovakian Communist leader Alexander Dubcek saw his efforts to ‘humanise’ the Soviet occupation of his eastern European country wrecked. His country and people demanded democratic reform, but they were met with brutal force. What was to be called the “Prague Spring” came to an end because the Soviet Union would not tolerate it. Many today will equate the Georgian Mikhail Saakashvili with Dubcek – and they are wrong.
Alexander Dubcek was a Marxist-Leninist to the core. The commentariat will probably tell you he was a “Western-style democrat.” This label will fit their purposes of the moment, but it will also be an assault on well-established historical facts. This happens all the time. Western politicians and the commentariat will tell you they know history. But the fact of the matter is they selectively use history to promote their ideologically driven agendas of today. And they will in the process assault Dubcek’s memory no differently than Soviet tanks did forty years ago.
I hold Dubcek in high regard. He tried to improve a worldview that could not be improved – that system was Soviet ideology crossed with Soviet geopolitics. He is one of history’s great “successful failures.” Dubcek fought the law and lost. In an ironic – even heroic way – his fate probably finally convinced those still hoping the Soviet system would reform itself were wrong.
OK, I have provided the shortest possible history of the Prague Spring. Does this have anything to do with Saakashvili’s Georgia of today? I emphatically answer NO!
Dubcek did not seek Czechoslovakia’s withdrawal from the Soviet block to join the West. Nor did Dubcek resort to the use of force. Saakashvili used appalling force against civilians and internationally recognized peacekeepers to convince his American handlers (and NATO) that he is a true “democrat.” Saakashvili’s aim was clear - advance American geopolitical interests in the Caucuses.
But let’s stay with history and today: Dubcek had an internal quarrel within the Soviet empire – Saakashvili aimed to be a proxy to divide the West against Russia. Saakashvili has succeeded, but he lost control of his country in the process. And his Western friends, at the end of the day, will not and cannot do anything about this. Saakashvili will be remembered as one of history’s “truly unsuccessful winners.”
Before anyone accuses me of double-standards or hypocrisy, let me state that all sovereign states should do what they wish, including joining political-military blocks like NATO. But we should all recognize the nature of the international system. Every country’s security interests should be understood, respected and met. NATO’s reckless drive to expand eastward is very dangerous, particularly since it does so in the name of democracy and peace. Saakashvili has proven he has no interest in either. Interestingly enough, Dubcek was a strong supporter of both.
We should honor Dubcek’s memory and condemn Saakashvili as he confronts his hangover. Saakashvili is addicted to power and political ambition – and the ability to fool Western leaders and the commentariat.
History, in the long term, will be kinder to Dubcek than Saakashvili – Dubcek had values, dignity, and perspective. Saakashvili is only about obsession, vanity and hubris. It is a pity the West continues to overlook this in its drive to protect itself at the expense of everyone else in the world. Everyone involved will pay a high price – needlessly.
August 20, 2008, 0:04
NATO: deaf, mute, and blind
Did the NATO presser on the South Ossetian crisis presented by the alliance’s head Jaap de Hoop Scheffer make any sense to you? I didn’t know whether to cry or laugh. It was an appalling exercise in doublethink and confusion.
Scheffer started out by saying: “it’s not business as usual with Russia.” That is the only thing he said that reflects reality. NATO’s “business as usual” is to ignore Russia’s legitimate security interests – particularly when it comes to expansion eastwards. The rest of his less-than-media-slick presentation demonstrated that NATO is simply at a loss – completely disconnected with how the world has changed after its favourite Georgian son fully de-legitimised NATO’s mantras of “spreading democracy” and “projecting peace.”
How is NATO deaf?
De Hoop Scheffer’s not-ready-for-prime-time show glaringly tells us that he and the alliance he heads will not listen to criticism or respect the security interests of others. When asked to justify the alliance’s existence almost two decades after the end of the Cold War, he was defiant and basically speechless. When asked about Georgia’s culpability for starting the war against South Ossetia, he was silent. He simply refused to answer a journalist’s question - “business as usual.”
How is NATO mute?
De Hoop Scheffer refuses to comprehend that Russia is adhering to its commitment to the ceasefire plan in a way that any actor in a complex conflict zone must always face. Yes, it is far easier to enter a conflict zone than to leave it. A military alliance should understand this. But then again, NATO is only really interested in promoting very specific geopolitical interests that ignore the security of others like Russia. Indeed, “business as usual.”
NATO has shown zero responsibility when it comes to security in the south Caucasus. Even after Saakashvili’s recklessness, Tbilisi is still welcomed into the alliance. If this isn’t the death of outrage, I don’t know what is. Georgia is neither peaceful nor democratic. But that doesn’t matter. NATO has a two-decade long tradition of saying one thing and doing another - “business as usual.”
How is NATO blind?
NATO is an organisation that demands to exist for existence sake. The alliance needs a ten-step self-help programme to wean itself off bad habits. It cannot see how the world has changed. The Cold War is long over. It would seem that the alliance likes living in the past. But alas, it needs an enemy to keep those generous paychecks coming. Russia is not NATO’s enemy. But NATO’s behaviour tells us the opposite.
Even Helen Keller could sense that NATO is going down the wrong path. NATO and Russia face a multitude of global security threats. Why should one madman in Tbilisi derail all of this?
I suppose it is "Business as usual.”
August 18, 2008, 0:19
Beyond South Ossetia: The Red Lines
There is no such thing as a “splendid little war” anymore. In the current and rapidly changing world order, reliance on a quick war to alter geopolitics and to dramatically improve the prospects of a single country’s foreign policy is an illusion. This is what Saakashvili tried to achieve. His reckless gambit to unite his country through force witnessed the senseless death of thousands, his country’s sovereignty forever compromised and Russia’s relations with the West altered for the worse. The outcome of all of this is the creation of new geopolitical “red lines.”
Tbilisi started a war and Russia finished it. There are those, almost exclusively found in the West, who claim that Russia used “disproportionate force” in reaction to Saakashvili’s order to invade South Ossetia. However, few in the West acknowledge that Saakashvili’s invasion of South Ossetia can only be called an absurd use of disproportionate force. The South Ossetian military (actually a glorified police force) did receive limited aid from Russia. But Russia always relied on its peacekeepers to keep the peace. Peacekeepers that Tbilisi asked Russia for in the first place.
However, this cannot be said of American support of Georgia’s military. Tbilisi’s armed forces were much more – the U.S. created a Georgian military to do much more than police. Over the past few years Tbilisi’s military budget ballooned, among the top 5 countries in the world in terms of military spending per GDP. The Georgian military was developed to make war in its neighbourhood (and support American military operations globally). In the end, Saakashvili favoured force over diplomacy. He also favoured confrontation with the hope of outside intervention (U.S. and/or NATO). Saakashvili’s gross risk-taking ended in failure with global implications.
Has Russia’s actions in Georgia been disproportionate? I am not a military expert and I can’t say with precision. However, I note the lazy and biased commentariat is always an expert on just about everything when it spins its spin. My sense is that Russia’s military doesn’t want to have to repeat this exercise again. That means ensuring the Georgian military and its political elite pay a very high price for what they have done. All of this translates into disrupting any infrastructure that could aid Tbilisi in a future military adventure against its breakaway republics. Of course, when Russian forces start returning to their barracks, there will be claims that Russia only worsened Georgia’s humanitarian woes. The commentariat will give this issue blanket coverage in the coming days.
Standing alone and very open to criticism, I would rather stand on the side of avoiding more senseless armed conflicts.
Before I address the “new red lines” created by Saakashvili’s “splendid, but huge catastrophe,” I want to address the claim – actually from those who crave conspiracies theories – that Russia planned this war and created a trap for Saakashvili. This is simply rubbish. All major militaries prepare contingency plans. We all knew things were brewing between Russia and Georgia. This is why a contingency plan was devised! There is also a mountain of evidence that Tbilisi was planning a conflict contingency plan as well. Preparing for a conflict is not a smoking gun pointing to guilt. It does not give cause to apportion blame. Experienced and sober leaders always hope not to fallback on contingencies. I am convinced that Saakashvili didn’t believe in contingencies. He believed in only force.
Ok, what are the new “red lines?”
Saakashvili had long hoped to make himself an important surrogate of American foreign advancement into the post-Soviet space. He very much succeeded. Ignored are the facts that Saakashvili is a gross Georgian nationalist and autocratic. NATO membership is the perfect cover for Saakashvili’s amazing deficiencies. In the West he is called a “democrat who embraces American values.” The fact is that Georgia’s democracy is very frail – if it can even be called a democracy at all. Russia’s democracy is in fact more stable, but with lots of room to develop. But then again, Russia doesn’t try to export democracy or any other ideology through force, like Washington or Tbilisi.
So, what is the first “red line?” Saakashvili has dashed his claim to preserve and protect Georgia as a sovereign state. South Ossetia and Abkhazia will have a fate beyond Tbilisi’s control. The longer Saakashvili, Bush, Rice and the EU claim otherwise, the longer it will take all them to find Georgia in NATO. And because none of these actors can understand this gives me reason to believe Georgia’s NATO ambitions will be on hold for a very long time.
This creates other “red lines.”
The EU is divided and will remain divided on Georgian and Ukrainian NATO membership. Over the past few days we have witnessed this. And it actually has nothing to do with Georgian events. It has everything to do with Russia. The US and New Europe are pitted against Old Europe. All this causes paralysis when engaging Russia. This state of affairs is unconstructive for all involved. What about Russia-EU energy relations? What about the new Russia-EU partnership agreement? What about desperately needed new security agreements? All of this is at stake because of the most famous Georgian since Stalin! Why is all of this being held hostage due to the ravings of a single madman hoping the West would save his political career, legacy, and protect his country in spite of himself?
Let’s consider another “red line” and its called Ukraine. The vast majority of Ukrainian citizens are against NATO membership. Now a minority of them, going for broke like Saakashvili, may appeal to the West for protection against Russia. The commentariat’s lease on life will be extended still gain.
This could go as far a splitting Ukraine. This is not an exaggeration. The US made it loud and clear that there will be “consequences” for Russia’s reaction to Saakashvili’s adventurism. But all of these reactions to date are benign to say the least, like cancelling a military exercise, throwing Russia out of the G8, and denying Russia WTO admission. Wow! Now that is a powerful toolbox full of retaliation! Today, now more than ever, it is patiently clear that the US will not follow up protecting its so-called friends. The demonstration effect is already in play. Nonetheless, I expect more Saakashvili-inspired “wag-the-dog” enterprises.
Another “red line” is the important legal difference between territorial integrity and a state’s sovereignty. Because of the Kosovo precedent, the great powers of today can decide which principle they prefer more, based on geopolitical interest and advantage. Almost a century of international legal prudence is in tatters. This is truly a sad state of affairs. But it is the US that set this precedent. It is hypocritical of Washington to lash-out at those who do the same.
Let’s turn to the large-scale global “red line.” Bush told Medvedev to get out of Georgia. Well, Medvedev could, just as easily, tell Bush to get out Iraq! (With all the same predicted outcome!). Russia’s military forces will leave Georgia when the security situation on the ground allows it to. But in the mean time Washington really needs to figure out what it wants from Russia. Does it want a partnership or just another “junior partner of the willing?” Or does it want confrontation? Russia is prepared for all options.
Russia’s actions to protect South Ossetia, Abkhazia and punish Saakashvili’s megalomania say it all. Russia’s actions demonstrate that it protects its security concerns within its neighbourhood based on practiced legal norms by the West.
Finally, let’s look beyond South Ossetia. The West and its leader, the US, have some hard thinking ahead of them. There are some very real and difficult realities facing the international community: international terrorism, Iran nuclear program, the unpredictable regime in North Korea, the spread of WMDs, for the food and energy crises, and climate change. Can any of these issues be decide without Russia’s participation? The answer is no.
This is how I see things: The post-soviet space is undergoing enormous change. We must recognise that the community of neighbours that this space will determine its own future. Western definitions of what "democracy means" is a cover for sidelining very real security interests. Outside meddling isn’t the answer. And we aren’t entering a new Cold War. In fact, the West (really the US) is finally beginning to see that it can’t remake the world in its own image. Russia won’t let this happen. Why, you might ask? Because it has the power to do so.
August 15, 2008, 1:01
Beyond South Ossetia – the new world order
Georgia’s (still) President Mikhail Saakashvili threw the dice and lost everything. His blind ambition to return South Ossetia to Tbilisi’s control through force has resulted in an unmitigated defeat for Georgia’s sovereignty. The world needs to take note and it signals things to come.
South Ossetia is a small and poor place. Who would have thought that it would herald the start of a new world order? But it has in ways almost no one could have imagined.
Saakashvili’s crazed mission to capture South Ossetia through war ends a paradigm – what is called the post-Cold era. Russia, for the first time as a new and very different state, used force beyond its borders since 1991. It did it in the name of protecting Russian citizens and defending internationally recognised peacekeepers. And both are justified - the West does the same. The world would be advised to get used to this as other ethnic Russians appeal for help beyond Russia’s borders.
Today we are all faced with the prickly debate defining the difference between state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Politicians and lawyers continue to talk about this. In the mean time, facts on the ground are proceeding forward with the most unpredictable consequences.
The catalyst for all this was Kosovo. The major Western powers decided Kosovo should be independent above the heads of the people on the ground. Today Russia listens to the people on the ground. And this is the important difference. Washington and Brussels have unwittingly admitted that self-determination is more important than a state’s sovereignty. Russia and Russians are following this lead. The post-Soviet space is poised for more change (of borders) and the West and its double-standards are the cause of this.
There is much criticism of Russia’s actions. It is said that Russia is backing international actors - South Ossetia and Abkhazia - not recognised by international law. But the fact of the matter is Moscow has forcibly demonstrated that the post-Cold War order supports only Western interests and that this approach needs to change. In the wake of South Ossetia’s invasion, Moscow is in touch with this new sentiment.
According to the West’s democracy theology, South Ossetia and Abkhazia cannot be recognised as independent. Why is this? Is it because independence for both would derail Saakashvili’s bid to join NATO? Of course it is! The West doesn’t know much about Georgia, South Ossetia, or Abkhazia. Nor does it really care. And Saakashvili has shown he can’t cross the divide between being a Georgian nationalist and a Western stooge.
I have no idea; maybe Saakashvili truly has acted in good faith, but what we all can see looks different. He failed to see that what is most important is the projection of Western security interests. And this has always been at the expense of Russia’s security concerns.
Saakashvili claims all his actions were in the name of the Georgian people. He doesn’t appear to understand he changed the world order. All people who wish to be free and have their own state have Saakashvili to thank.
I doubt that this is the legacy Saakashvili had hoped for. Saakashvili’s backers in Washington are surely cursing him for not doing what he was told. He was, after all, only a hired employee to take orders.
August 7, 2008, 21:38
Why South Ossetia, why now?
Why South Ossetia and why now? The broader picture is of course Saakashvili’s NATO ambitions. He needs to unite his country for NATO to deliver on its promise of a MAP (Membership Action Program) to enter the Western military-political block. And Saakashvili desperately wants to have this completed by December when the alliance again meets.
The fact that Saakashvili is pressuring South Ossetia now is obvious – the whole world is watching the Summer Olympics in Beijing. And it goes without saying the US will turn a blind eye to Saakashvili’s senseless aggression. NATO will probably do the same, though with the usual pinch of moralising and some fluff about respecting human rights.
I fully expect that Georgia will bring overwhelming military force to bear at some point. Many civilians will be killed. The whole operation will be called a “police action.” Saakashvili will claim that the status quo was untenable. (This of course strikes me as odd; the current status quo is far from perfect, but at least civilian deaths were low).
Can military action against South Ossetia succeed? Certainly. Georgia can invade and occupy South Ossetia. Western countries and Ukraine have supplied Georgia with an arsenal of heavy weaponry. And American military personnel have trained the new Georgian armed forces. Will Abkhazia honor its commitment to assist South Ossetia if it is invaded? Will Russian irregulars enter the fray? We have heard a lot of grand statements about this, but both claims are problematic at best.
Let’s assume Tbilisi can “win on the battlefield”. But will it be able to re-assimilate South Ossetia and South Ossetians? That will be very hard indeed. For about 15 years –almost a generation – this separatist republic has lived without Georgia, few Georgians, and the Georgian language. And Tbilisi’s brutal behaviour to stop South Ossetia’s bid for independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union literally created a lot of bad blood. To top it off, most citizens of South Ossetia have Russian passports. And there is strong evidence a South Ossetian identity now exists (and that identity is defined by not being Georgian or part of the Georgian state).
What will Russia do if there is a military strike against South Ossetia? Directly, I suspect it will do very little. It should be completely ruled out that Russia will use military force. But this does not mean Russia will remain neutral. Russia’s people-to-people contacts and trade links with South Ossetia are strong. Tbilisi will have to offer a lot of money and reconstruction – not to mention an apology for killing its civilians - to bring South Ossetia back into the fold. And this is the optimistic scenario!
This is where Russia will play an indirect role. South Ossetians look to Russia for help. And Russia has done that. Tbilisi’s trade blockade against South Ossetia (a very poor region) has seen Russia step-in to render a hand. Russia has brought peace and stability to this breakaway republic and it wants things to stay that way. A military conflict will completely upset the current arrangement.
By going to war, Tbilisi will have its hands full. It will cut South Ossetian-Russian ties. Not only will the financial costs be high for Tbilisi, but there will be South Ossetian resentment at being cut off from Russia’s North Ossetia. And Russia will object that its fellow passport holders will be subject to civil and human rights limitations and violations.
Georgia is poised to invade South Ossetia because it can. But South Ossetia is not the real aim of this. Abkhazia is the real target. South Ossetia is a test to gauge Russia’s reaction. Once active resistance is subdued in South Ossetia, Tbilisi will taunt Abkhazia with “See, your Russian friends didn’t do much for South Ossetia, nor will they really help you. Now come to the table and surrender.” This will be a huge miscalculation. Abkhazia is not South Ossetia.
Abkhazia is stable, self-confident and even rich - if investment continues. Abkhazia can also defend itself. A Georgian military operation against South Ossetia will have the opposite impact on Abkhazia – the latter will turn inward and cease to be part of any negotiated arrangement with Tbilisi. And it wouldn’t surprise me if Russia drew a line in the sand – that it will henceforth protect Russian citizens anywhere in the world (just like the US does today).
What will all of this lead to? South Ossetia, if invaded and occupied, will become a long-term headache for Tbilisi. A low-level insurgency will harass the Georgian occupiers. South Ossetian identity will only grow. NATO will also turn its back on Saakashvili - it will not induct a new member that is domestically unstable. Abkhazia will wait it out. Maybe in another 15 years the world will finally recognize the inevitable – Abkhazia is a viable nation-state worthy of independence. I am sure the Abkhazians are more than willing to wait for this to happen. Returning to Tbilisi’s fold is simply not an option anymore.
A parting thought: Saakashvili has it all wrong. The use of force or the threat of force demonstrates just how bankrupt his vision for a united Georgia is. He wants reconciliation by use of a gun. How can one truly and honestly resolve differences when one party puts a gun to the head of the other?
I have said time and again that Tbilisi has to take the hard road to unite the country. And that way is the “demonstration effect.” Make Tbilisi-controlled Georgia prosperous, safe, with a future, and not anti-Russia. When all of this really happens, then South Ossetia and Abkhazia might take a moment to reconsider their positions. Nothing succeeds like success!
To date, Saakashvili is one big loser.
August 5, 2008, 21:41
Solzhenitsyn: The Great Odyssey
The news of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s passing demands that we recall the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the future of human liberty. He played an important role in all, though for reasons that remain hotly debated today – and I suspect for a long time to come.
Solzhenitsyn always presented himself as a simple and straight-forward person. This is what made it so hard to understand him at times – and made it easy to strongly disagree with him. In fact he was simple and straight-forward, but how the world changed around him was far more complex. Simplicity and the complex were at the very core of Solzhenitsyn’s truly amazing odyssey.
Solzhenitsyn fought the law and won. Against all the odds, he stood up to the Soviet regime and the regime blinked first. Alone and armed with a conscience, this single individual stared down a regime that destroyed the lives of millions. His arsenal was modest, but more than enough to prevail at the time: speak the truth and remain devoted to what was Russian.
The first time the world learned about Solzhenitsyn was with the publication in 1962 of “One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich.” It was a literary earthquake. There was finally an official recognition of what millions of Soviet citizens knew all along – the Soviet Union imprisoned its people for the slightest offence or for no offence at all. A countless number of lives were lost, families destroyed, and it was forbidden to even speak about it. That was the system that Lenin and Stalin built. And that same system did everything it could to destroy Russian culture, history, and identity.
But the publication of this novel was not out of kindness toward former the GULAG prisoner Solzhenitsyn, or the millions that the GULAG destroyed. Nikita Khrushchev allowed the novel to be published to purge the Communist Party of Stalin’s crimes. Solzhenitsyn didn’t return the favour. He wanted the entire communist experience to be purged for what it had done to Russia. This was the first time Solzhenitsyn showed that he was not a fellow traveller with anyone but his own conscience. It would not be the last.
In the end, it was Khrushchev who was purged from the Communist Party. In 1964 Leonid Brezhnev became party leader. He had no use for the likes of Solzhenitsyn. Khrushchev’s “thaw” quickly faded, but nothing of the sort would become of Solzhenitsyn. Like an irrepressible sunrise, Solzhenitsyn continued with his ravaging literary critique of the Soviet Union and its senseless ideology. The publication of the “GULAG Archipelago” in the West was the last straw. Too well-known internationally to imprison or make a “non-person,” Solzhenitsyn was forcibly exiled in 1974. Eventually, he spent twenty years of his life in the quiet state of Vermont in the United States. But Solzhenitsyn’s odyssey was far from finished.
Solzhenitsyn never took to the US nor did he even try. For the West, Solzhenitsyn’s plight was a Cold War public relations victory. Again, Solzhenitsyn would not reciprocate. He refused to learn English, confined himself to his estate compound, and never allowed himself to be a PR tool in the Cold War conflict. Solzhenitsyn was not interested in the Cold War; he had a different battle to fight and agenda to promote. And he made sure Washington, the Western media, and his lost homeland knew about it. In a speech at Harvard in 1978, he all but denounced his American hosts as culturally empty, without morals and values, and poured contempt on Western-style democracy. Like in the Soviet Union, Solzhenitsyn shortly became a “non-person” in the West.
Then it happened. The unthinkable, the improbable: the Soviet Union finally collapsed in 1991. Solzhenitsyn’s interrupted odyssey started its next chapter. When he returned to Russia in 1994 – with great fanfare and anticipation – the homeland he wrote about and so longed for had radically changed. Solzhenitsyn desperately wanted to connect to the Russia he always loved in his literary projects, but he couldn’t find it. And many Russians wanted to be able to connect with the man they believed understood them and their land, but it didn’t happen. For all concerned, the rest of his life was about mutual disenchantment.
For a few years, Solzhenitsyn grappled to understand the new Russia. He demanded a return to what he believed were unshakeable Russian values and morality. Most Russians only wanted to get on with life during the chaos of the 1990s. And Solzhenitsyn again showed that he would not get along by going along. He distanced himself from Russia’s new-styled democrats and President Boris Yeltsin. Like many times in his life, he found himself alone.
Before his death, Solzhenitsyn warmed to Vladimir Putin. The former president’s drive to return Russia to greatness on the international stage impressed him. But Solzhenitsyn refused to compromise. He sharply-criticised Putin’s sense of democracy and local government.
I have many thoughts, opinions and even emotions about Solzhenitsyn. It is easy to become exasperated by him. Change is part of life, but Solzhenitsyn rejected modernity. Solzhenitsyn was a staunch supporter of Russian nationalism. Russian nationalism is not what Russia needs; it needs a strong civic and democratic patriotism founded on a sound national ideal. Solzhenitsyn looked to the Orthodox Church for moral strength. That Church is only one place to find this. He also rejected a modern sense of individuality that is impossible to suppress.
So what do I think of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn? I know that the world and Russia is a better place because of him. His life was truly remarkable. He taught us all that moral courage still means something. He showed us that one person alone can make a difference.
Solzhenitsyn’s life was an amazing odyssey. His was an example of vexing stubbornness and inspiring virtue.
July 22, 2008, 21:07
Karadzic and the search for justice
After evading capture for over a decade, the Bosnian-Serb wartime leader Radovan Karadzic is finally in custody. It is expected that he will be sent to the Netherlands to stand trial in front of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Will Karadzic get a fair trial? Will anyone – those who died and those who survived the break-up of the Yugoslav state - get the justice they deserve? I doubt it.
Before I go any further, let me make it abundantly clear that I think Karadzic should face a court to account for the serious accusations made against him. The short list includes the three year strangulation of Sarajevo and the slaughter of about 8,000 Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica in 1997. These events and other accusations all add-up to the charge of committing genocide.
Karadzic was the ugly political face of Serbian nationalism in Bosnia as the former Yugoslavia collapsed into civil war. He was part of a terrible history, but he was far from alone. This is why sending him to the ICTY is problematic in the very least, and without a doubt more than a tad bit hypocritical.
The ICTY was established with a noble mission: to punish gross violators of human rights and serve as a deterrent stopping others from committing the same. Neither has happened. The ICTY was established 15 years ago, only later did the massacres at Srebrenica and the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo occur. The hope for deterrence never played out.
The ICTY was also supposed to promote justice and closure for victims and survivors – and prison terms for the perpetrators. The opposite has happened. The peoples of the former Yugoslavia, particularly the Serbs, view the tribunal as a political tool and full of bias. Instead of being a vehicle of reconciliation, the tribunal has only been a lightning-rod continuing hatred and grief.
There are numerous examples of the tribunal’s bias. First off is the fact that three-fourths of all indictments have been served against Serbs. I have no illusions on this score. Indeed some Serbs did commit war crimes, but to claim the “loser” in this conflict committed far more crimes than the other participants smacks of duplicity and a political agenda. Some of the Croat defendants at the tribunal will probably never stand trial. In one case, the reason is because of the defendant’s “poor health.”
Ante Gotovina is accused of heading a murderous campaign in 1995 that targeted Serbs with ethnic cleansing. It is quite possible he will walk. Why, one may ask? Just maybe the EU behind closed doors assured the Croat government that was always part of the deal for giving him up. Gotovina has been in custody for five years. There has been no meaningful movement in his trial. The ICTY is supposed to hear its last appeal in 2010 before it shuts down for good. All Gotovina has to do is stay in bed until then.
Let’s have a look at Kosovo. This new, but illegitimate, state is the new darling of the West. Amazingly, its wartime leaders are called “democrats” now. The gross human rights violations committed against Kosovo’s Serb minority since 1999 have been ignored by the ICTY and the international community. Look at the history and the names. Why aren’t many members of Kosovo’s government on trial in the Netherlands?
It appears Karadzic will have his day in court. But is it the right court?
Just about everyone I read in Western media claims the Serbian government finally gave up Karadzic to further Serbia’s membership in the EU. I completely agree that Serbia should be in the EU one day and soon. But if Karadzic’s trial turns out to be a “quickie” then we will all finally understand that the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was never about justice. If this comes to pass, then the first victim of the ICTY will be justice itself.
I am not defending Karadzic, but I am truly disappointed that politicians – not historians – have taken upon themselves to judge the past.
July 16, 2008, 21:19
McCain’s “Czechoslovakia” problem
Does knowledge of geography and history really matter? I think knowledge of both is very important for many reasons. And I am convinced the president of the United States should have a solid grasp – even if it is rudimentary knowledge – of geography and history to govern the most powerful country on the planet. The fact that presumptive Republican nominee John McCain has twice referred within a week to the Czech Republic as “Czechoslovakia” is very telling.
McCain calls himself an expert when it comes to national security and foreign policy. True, he has more experience in both than most American politicians (though that is not really saying much in the grander scheme of things).
Nonetheless, McCain demonstrates that he is either grossly unaware of some basic geopolitical facts or unable to understand how the world has changed since the end of the Cold War. Given McCain’s Cold War language when referring to Russia, one has to seriously question whether McCain believes that conflict really ever ended. Both have serious geopolitical implications. And the world should be very concerned.
I visited what was Czechoslovakia before that country separated into two states – the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1993. I don’t have any strong feelings about the former entity or the two successor states. And I can’t claim great knowledge of today’s Czech Republic or Slovakia.
I followed closely Czechoslovakia’s pre-WWII history and its communist experience. After the Czech Republic and Slovakia joined the EU, I lost any special interest. But then again, I am a former academic/former investment banker/turned today a media person. My deep knowledge of what was Czechoslovakia and relative knowledge of today’s Czech Republic and Slovakia is not really all that relevant anymore.
But I am not running to become president of the United States. This is why all of this matters, a lot!
McCain has proven he knows nothing about “Czechoslovakia” and the same about the Czech Republic. But it is not “Czechoslovakia” or the Czech Republic that he really cares about. The only reason his lack of knowledge of history and geography is a media topic is because of his intense suspicion of Russia. In the world according to McCain, Russia is not a reliable energy partner and a threat to Western security. Those claims portend important geopolitical implications if McCain wins the White House.
I am not exaggerating my case. Presidential candidate McCain should know which country in the world is agreeing to host part of an American anti-missile system that threatens Russia’s security and that will create havoc for the present global security architecture.
McCain should be aware of how Russia viewed as an insult Bush greeting Medvedev as a friend at Japan’s G8, while Condi Rice was in Prague (the Czech Republic) signing-up the Czechs to the deal. Given McCain’s record, he probably couldn't care less about offending Russia’s sensibilities. But does he understand that Russia’s sensibilities were offended! This is a scary thought.
McCain has mistaken the German president for the Russian one. He has shown he doesn’t understand the difference between the Shia and Sunni. There are many other gaffes. We all make mistakes, but the record shows the president of the United States can ill afford to be so ignorant of the world around him.
McCain’s mistake can be laughed at. But when the same mistakes drive policy decisions, then we are all in trouble. The definition of stupidity is the inability to learn. Where is McCain’s learning curve?
July 15, 2008, 21:39
Bronislaw Geremek remembered
I am greatly saddened by the death of Bronislaw Geremek. He was known most recently as a former Polish minister and a Eurocrat. He was very much more.
Geremek was a hero of my youth and the person who got me interested in the part of the world in which I have now spent most of my life (Poland is the reason I am in Russia today). For me he was like Jacek Kuron who died a few years ago. Both were part of the truly amazing hope called Poland's "Solidarnosc" during the 1980s.
Those were the old days. Geremek, an historian by trade and profession, stood up to Poland's communists and won - without violence. He spoke the language of reason and logic. He made a difference in 1989, allowing the communist regime in Poland to end without hatred and bloodshed. Geremek's contribution to the Polish "roundtable" of the year is historic. The rest of the Soviet communist world shortly followed suit. That is his greatest legacy. He was a great promoter of democracy and national dignity.
It is a pity that Poland's neo-cons - backed by Western supporters – never really gave him any credit. To the day he died, there were those who wanted to subject him to an anti-communist witch-hunt.
He gave so much, and yet he was credited with so little.
Agreed, in death, some great obituaries have been written, but in life he got so little real recognition. I, and many thoughtful people reflecting on the “post-Soviet purgatory,” will deeply miss him.
